Desire or Desire – and Ethics in it?

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Abstract

Desire, without a doubt, is the great enigma of post-modernity, it is the key issue for us to understand humanity, to understand ourselves. Psychoanalysis centers its ethics on desire. Lacan, in his seminar 7, outlines the ethics of psychoanalysis: “Do not give in to your desire”. In this way, psychoanalysis seems to meet structures prevailing in contemporary times: perversion and psychosis. And ethics, where is it? To explain the questions raised, we use the literary examples of Ana Terra, in Érico Veríssimo, and Teresa, in O Quatrilho, by José Clemente Pozenato, universal classics of Rio Grande do Sul culture.

Keywords: Desire • Love • Ethic • Philosophy • Psychoanalysis

Introduction

In order for us to be marked as desiring, to have a “voice full of value”, we need the primordial mark of a narcissistic institution, which we call the Love of the Other. Another one that plays a maternal role for us, as the founding mother of the loving imprint that we will carry in our lives. Without this initial mark, we are not considered structurally subjects, owners of an identity, we will always be tied to someone who must lead us through life, as this mark is primordial, necessary in our frantic struggle for liberation. With the brand we can free ourselves and follow. Without the brand, we are stuck with the Other’s desire, with its impositions:

Freud saw in the beginnings of psychic experience a primary identification that would consist of the “direct and immediate transference” of the ego in formation to the “father of individual prehistory”, which would have the sexual characteristics of father and mother and would be a conglomerate of their functions [1].

The story of Ana Terra, portrayed in Érico Veríssimo's O Tempo eo Vento, makes us think about this issue. Ana, as a subject, freed herself, lived her desire, went in search of something with strength and courage, took on the consequences of her actions, even though this implied the extreme pain of her father’s rejection, of affiliation. She took over her son, lived, despite everything, despite even the suffering of Peter’s death. The Minuano Wind is what gives Ana strength, she extracts life from it, it works as a symbolic phallus, a vital force to withstand the elements and live (“whenever something important happens to me, it’s windy”) [2]:

If the word penis is reserved for the royal member, the word phallus, derived from Latin, designates this organ more in the symbolic sense the adjective “phallic” occupies a large place in the Freudian theory of the single libido (of male essence), in the doctrine of female sexuality and sexual difference and, finally, in the conception of the different stages the phallus is a divine attribute Lacan makes the phallus the very signifier of desire. [3].

Like Dostoievski’s polyphonic voices, in the eyes of Bakhtin, Érico Veríssimo transposes Ana's dialogues and thoughts with the wind that demonstrate the unspoken, say and give life:

the multiplicity of independent and immiscible voices and consciences and the authentic polyphony of plenivalent voices the multiplicity of equipotent consciences and their worlds that here combine into a unity of event, maintaining their immiscibility [4].

Ana’s strength, and her relationship with the wind, doesn’t break even with her father's aggressions and estrangements. Ana only bends to love, in her relationship with “Pedro Missioneiro”, an Indian/husband, killed by Ana’s father and brothers, because he gets her pregnant without marrying (despite the purity of the customs and of Pedro's loving sincerity towards Ana). Ana listens beyond what was said. Ana listens with her heart.

Like Ana, we find Teresa, in O Quatrilho, by José Clemente Pozenato. Teresa is the woman who seeks answers, who wants to know more about life, who is not satisfied with the suffering life of local women who accept the structure of work, pain, inferiority and dissatisfaction. Teresa does not want the life of being silent and accepting what is given to women in the social sphere. Teresa wants to love, wants to know love, live it, experience it, wants to be happy. She gets married, is happy, plays, solves the problems that arise, is intelligent, fights for improvements in life, regardless of social dictates, the impositions of hypocritical and lying social law.

Teresa is the one who throws open the truth and assumes it with all its consequences. Teresa personifies the person we all want to be: true, assumed in our truths, hiding nothing, living our desire and being accepted by it. Hence the work, and Teresa in particular, are always current because they show how love (whether personal, dual or social) should be, as a constituent of the very being, of each one of us, perhaps the human identity.
Teresa introduces us to the feminine place of the Italian colonization culture, strong, who knows what she wants, and seeks that want, affectionate, seductive. Maia (1999) tells us what could be inferred about this condition of the feminine in the constituent structure:

Lacan states that, in phallocentric dialectics, the woman represents the absolute Other. There is a division of female jouissance in a part that the man incarnating the phallus for the woman and a part of jouissance related to the female sex as what is lacking in the Other as a signifier. Woman is the absolute Other, is God, for her and for man. However, in order to adore herself, she uses the man as a connector [5].

Ana and Teresa, as well as Antigone (who goes against the moral law and follows her ethics, her desire), represented in the works of Sophocles, are bearers of Desire. Desire as an instituting mark of difference, as a subject's singularity. Desire that comes from the love transmitted by the Other, which is vital energy, a life drive.

Plato, in The Banquet, tells us about Eros, as love, desire, life. It is Plato who best portrays and describes, in literature and philosophy, love, as the instituter of desire, the instituter of search, the instituter of difference:

Why start with a reading of this Platonic text? First, because all philosophy is potentially contained in Plato. Both the one that belongs to the great history of Western metaphysics and the one that sought to reverse or deconstruct Platonism. But not all of Plato is in philosophy. He exceeds it by resorting to myths, the staging of a literary carnival and the dialogical effects of writing. Secondly, because it is a founding text for the Western conception of love, always resurrected and commented on, from Plotinus or Marsilio Ficino to Freud or Lacan, [6].

How can we understand and interpret ethics, from philosophy, from antiquity to post-modernity? For psychoanalysis, what is Desire? Thinking about psychoanalytic theory and psychoanalysis, as psychotherapy, based on ethics is essential when we refer to post-modernity, a period characterized (and marked) by perversion and psychosis. Jacques Lacan, French theorist and psychoanalyst, in his Seminar already outlined the ethics of psychoanalysis [7]. "Do not give in to your Desire", he said:

What makes it possible for there to be human desire, for this field to exist, is the assumption that everything that actually happens is accounted for somewhere. Kant was able to reduce the essence of the moral field to its purity, but in its central point it remains that there must be, at some point, a place for accounting. It is as if the subject situates himself and constitutes himself in relation to the signifier that this rupture, this division, this ambivalence takes place in him, at whose level the tension of desire is located.

If the ethics of psychoanalysis is the ethics of Desire – to live and act according to our Desire –, how to reconcile it with post-modern times? Is psychoanalysis ethical – in the strictest sense – towards contemporary society? Wouldn't psychoanalysis be contributing to the increase in individualism and egocentrism, which are characteristic of our times?

Alain Juranville, in Lacan and Philosophy, tells us that:

The question of ethics imposes itself on psychoanalysis because it is a social practice and because, like any practice, it seeks a certain being better, a Good. But this question poses for it in a very particular way. In effect, ethics intends to give an object at will and places us in the scope of the world and the project (this is where it can be said that the analyst "knows what he does", due to the practice he assumes). Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, is based, above all, on the affirmation of the existence of the unconscious, which, rigorously thought, calls into question the being-in-the-world of man. How to articulate unconscious and ethics? [8]

Emmanuel Levinas, a contemporary philosopher, without being a psychoanalyst, built his theory, in the same way as Lacan, based on the conception of Other and Gaze. Both, however in different theories, proposed that relationships started from an “encounter”. This initial meeting takes place between the self and the Other, based on the Gaze launched by this Other. For this relationship to exist, however, a third party is needed.

Levinas bases his ethics on the statement: my freedom begins when the Other's begins [9]. That is, my freedom begins when I serve as a support for the Other and allow him to exercise his freedom, originating a relationship, the meeting. Such an assertion went against that "my freedom ends when the other's begins", which, intrinsically, contributes to an ethics of monads, an individualistic ethics. Exercising ethics, exercising freedom, for Levinas, is to preserve the Other of my "will to power", of my narcissism. For Levinas, each ethical act means one dying for the Other, one replacing the death of the Other, one postponing the death of the Other. Levinas' ethics is the act itself, it is the concrete realization of human freedom, of the love that we propose to think, social:

Man is the only being I cannot meet without expressing this encounter to him. The encounter is distinguished from knowledge precisely because of this. There is a greeting in every attitude towards the human – even when there is a refusal to greet. What distinguishes thought that aims at an object from a link with a person is that a vocative is articulated in it: what is named is, at the same time, what is called.

A question is then asked: to what extent does psychoanalysis propose an ethics? Would not Levinasian ethics be important and necessary for the construction of a psychoanalytic ethics? This research investigates putting psychoanalysis under analysis. What are the philosophical foundations of the ethics of psychoanalysis, based on theorists such as Plato, Sigmund Freud, Arthur Schopenhauer, Jacques Lacan, Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida? If the ethics of psychoanalysis is the ethics of desire, is psychoanalysis being ethical, before society, characterized, in post-modernity, by clinical structures, perversion and psychosis? This study also seeks to analyze, as an appendix, the work Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, in order to reflect on the issue of desire, bearing in mind that psychoanalysis focuses its studies and his theory on the Oedipus Complex. If human culture is based on, formed, in the prohibition of incest originated in Sophocles' Oedipal myth, how to think about culture, desire and man based on Deleuzian Anti-Oedipus? Assuming that the ethics of psychoanalysis is the ethics of desire, constituted from love, to investigate how this ethics is configured, from the Platonic ethics, portrayed in O Banquete (1991), contrasting it with the ethics of the discourse of Jürgen Habermas, contained in Commentaries on the Ethics of Discourse [10]. What does it mean to be ethical in post-modernity, according to the authors surveyed? What does Derrida say about psychoanalysis? According to the thinker, is psychoanalysis being ethical, as it is in a state of "psychic cruelty"? What are the confluences of Derrida with Jacques Lacan, regarding psychoanalysis, its ethics and the desire (of the analyst and the analysand)? If psychoanalysis links its ethics to the ethics of the subject (ethics of Desire), how is it found in society? Are your actions, towards the
other, ethical? What are the relationships between psychoanalysis and philosophy, under the prism of ethics and desire, from Lacan to Derrida?

Desire/Desire and ethics

In postmodern times, with its so unique characteristics, it is extremely important to propose a research, with limits between ethics, desire and psychoanalysis, as we witness a crisis of values and a stagnation, in some aspects, of psychoanalysis in the late 19th and early 20th century.

Society has evolved (?), and psychoanalysis, it seems to me, is still centered on neurosis, a clinical structure that no longer fits with a large part of society. Currently, the current clinical structures are psychosis and perversion and it is up to psychoanalysis, together with philosophy, to propose a reformulation of thought and theories in this regard. Philosophy here as the most viable (and external) way to think with psychoanalysis, or to help it in its reflection on itself.

Derrida does a linguistic deconstruction to arrive at an understanding, which he wants us to arrive with. With psychoanalysis, there is a linguistic deconstruction of the subject, so that he can “meet”, understand himself effectively, as a psychic structure. In this way, it is necessary, important and relevant, to investigate how Derrida deconstructs psychoanalysis, especially in and with the work States-of-the-soul of psychoanalysis (2001), so that we arrive at a new conception of society-desiring subject:

Who suffers and mourns? Who suffers from what? What is the complaint of psychoanalysis? What condolence book does she open? Who signs? What does not go well according to the prevailing marks of its discourse, its practice, its hypothetical or virtual community, its institutional inscriptions, its relations with what was once called civil society and the State, in the disturbance of its sociology, and in a different way in each country, in the mutation that affects the figure of patients and practitioners, in the transformation of demand, of the scene and of what I called the “analytic situation” – about which I Do I remember talking, decades ago, about its precariousness and historical artificiality [11]?

This research proposes to carry out a deep analysis of psychoanalysis, as an “institution” bearing ethics; ethics that must be studied, evaluated, re-evaluated. Thinking about ethical issues, in contemporary times, is undoubtedly an interesting, instigating and necessary task. Thus, using psychoanalysis and philosophy is appropriate and advantageous. Socrates, in the words of Plato, in the Apology of Socrates, already put us on ethics: If I told you that this is the greatest good for man, meditate every day on virtue and on the other subjects that you have heard me and others, and that a life devoid of such analyses is not worth living, if I told you this, you would believe me even less.

Psychoanalysis, as an interpretive theory of reality, as “hermeneutics”, serves to analyze the phenomena, in the individual field, through the manifestations of the unconscious, present in the language of different subjects, in jokes, in the interpretation of dreams, etc. It can, however, interpret social phenomena by analyzing the manifestations of society, organizations and institutions, and social groups. Allied to philosophy, essential for its development since the beginning, psychoanalysis, in addition to performing interpretations, reflects on facts, using the theories of great thinkers.

Thus, in this work, psychoanalysis and philosophy come together to reflect on its ethics. The ethics of psychoanalysis is centered on the ethics of being, as a desiring subject; that is, the ethics of psychoanalysis is the ethics of Desire (Desire as an identity mark). How does the subject realize his (sexual) identity? Lacan states that it goes beyond castration, as it implies the dimension of the third. Initially, according to the author, the subject is with the Other, in a relationship of dependence, of care. This Other is the mother, not necessarily the biological mother or a woman, The Other who does the mothering. The Other, little by little, introduces a third party, the father, not necessarily the biological father or a man, the one who makes the difference from what motherhood is. This Other, when desiring the partner, Place of Desire of the Mother, institutes in the child the desire for someone other than this child. Thus, the paternal place in the structure is determined, place of the third, place of the paternal “law”, the law of the Father’s Name. This third place constitutes a law internal to the subject, the law of interdiction (“you can all but this one, which is mine!”). As the subject identifies with the mother, or with the father, boy or girl, this identification determines his choice of object, decision of the male or female side in his sexual choice.

Sexual fulfillment depends on disconnection from the Other. The Other is immortal, he remains in the structure as love, Institution of Desire. Desire that will make you have different desires, in life, in the world. There is no cultural signifier that accounts for this death. Desire is indestructible, Desire is immortal. For Spinoza: the essence of man is desire. Hegel, with his Dialectics of the Lord and the Slave, in Phenomenology of Spirit, says that desire is the desire for recognition. For Lacan, the dialectic is resolved in the recognition of Desire.

The death of the Father is represented, in culture, through the individual’s personal progress. Assisting these personal advances of the subject in its structuring, we find Kant’s Categorical Imperative, Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals: “Act in such a way that the maxim of your will can always be valid as a principle of universal legislation” [12]. This statement guides the subject’s action and protects him from helplessness, a source of moral ethics.

The desire that constitutes us is our ethical differential before the world. Seeking it, we differentiate ourselves from others, we become unique. Rajchman shows us how [13]

Desire would be the only ‘ethical universal’ we have; and the novelty of Freud’s revolutionary practice consisted in placing this tragic issue at the center of our ethical thinking, promising us something new in the possibilities of our almores [13].

Roland Barthes, in Fragments of a loving discourse states, regarding desire: [14]

To show you where your desire is, just forbid it (if it is true that there is no desire without prohibition). X..., wants me to be there, by his side, as long as I leave him a little free: malleable, absent sometimes, but staying not far away; on the one hand it is necessary that I be present as a prohibition (without which there would be no good desire), but it is also necessary that I move away when I run the risk of disturbing the formed desire A little prohibition, a lot of game.

Desire, which structures us as human beings and induces us to search for life throughout our existence, is “transmitted” to us in the desire of the Other, the desire of the one who once desired us (before our generation, by our parents) and who later “looked” at us with a look of possibilities to
live and be happy. This initial, structural desire, launched by the Other, is what we call, in psychoanalysis, love, love of structure.

Juranville differentiates the structures neurosis, psychosis and perversion, regarding the desire and love of structure:

The psychotic does not give, does not want the relationship with the Other, who would suppose that he would enter into castration. "Psychosis", says Lacan, "is a kind of failure as far as the realization of what is called 'love' is concerned." In it, the subject wants absolute jouissance, which he actually knows at the level of his body. Hence his narcissism. [In perversion] it is given only to the symbolic Other, essentially absent from the world. All human "others", including the subject himself, are instruments of jouissance for this Other. The neurotic therefore needs a supplementary symbolic, that is, the symptom, where the desire remains repressed.

In topological terms, based on the Borromean node proposed by Lacan, Juranville elaborates the three structures in this way:

To love is to see in the other the desire for me that constitutes me. But it's a decoy, because what I actually see is actually a reflection of my desire for the other. Socrates, in the voice of Plato, in The Banquet, says Diotima, says that to love is to desire what you still don't have, what you lack, what you want to keep with you. Love is love of something.

Zilmara Simm Tonon, when talking about Love and fiction, states that love is represented in literature, cinema, theater, and the arts in general [15]. According to the psychoanalyst, passion, in its countless manifestations, opposes the obstacles that cause conflicts, and the consequences of these difficulties keep the viewer in a state of suspense and fascination:

What catches attention is both the pursuit of the realization of the ideal of love and its impossibility. The analytical experience replaces this mythical representation of the search for the other as a complement, for the search for oneself in the experience of love. sooner or later, love ends up revealing its decoy face, because loving is, essentially, wanting to be loved. The subject loves the other, while that other reflects its own image, or while it reflects a favorable image of itself. In this sense, love is eminently narcissistic.

Unlike Plato, who conceives of love as movement, drive, life, desire for something, search for something, Schopenhauer found the a priori manifesting itself in the Will [16]. As Dumoulié puts it, our knowledge is enclosed in the world of phenomena, therefore of representation, but we have immediate intuition through our body, the intimate essence of beings and the world. For Schopenhauer, who was influenced by Plato and Kant, the world is a phenomenon, it is representation. The Will would be in a world of ideas - platonistic, in an idealized, superior, unreachable world, which can only be symbolized. The Will, however, is not external, for Schopenhauer, it is in us, as shown by Dumoulié in 2005 [6].

The thing itself, which we cannot know from the outside, we reach it directly from the inside, as it is in us. This Will, of which the human will is but a manifestation, is a metaphysical principle, the mainstay of all that it is. The expression "thing in itself" must be understood in the most concrete way, as an almighty Thing that inhabits each one of us, that makes us live and devours us at the same time. In essence it is a raw, blind and insatiable desire [6].

Schopenhauer states that, if desire is born out of lack, its origin is suffering [17]. Both at the origin and at the end, according to Schopenhauer, desire is always suffering; and as he is the very essence of existence, "suffering is the foundation of all life."
Schopenhauer presents himself as the first philosopher who addressed the theme of love until then abandoned by poets. Only Plato, before him, would have addressed this question. The basis of Schopenhauer’s “metaphysics of love” is “physics”. As a precursor of psychoanalysis, he states that all passion is rooted in the sexual instinct or is an individualized sexual instinct, again followed and explained by Dumoulié [6]: “What we believe to be our desire is only the manifestation of the Thing itself, infinite, blind, and which seeks nothing else but the perpetuation of the Will for the procreation of species.

Schopenhauer, unlike Plato and the literary tradition, who conceive of love in an idealized and sentimental way, does not consider the union of souls or the reciprocity of feelings as the goal of love, but only sexual enjoyment, copulation and the pleasure that comes from it, with the purpose of procreation, preservation of the species. But even so, this enjoyment is nothing more than a lure, instinctive of the species. Schopenhauer establishes a double law relating to desire: opposites attract and each seeks in the other what he lacks. In this way, one looks for a loved one as a whole? Is psychoanalysis ethical, since the demand is the demand for love. Very viable vital relationship between human beings and the part of the subject, Lacan proposes that one establishes a double law relating to desire: opposites attract and each seeks in the other what he lacks. In this way, one looks for a loved one who possesses what one is lacking. Here there is a connection with Plato and with Lacan.

Although Lacan seemed to have a great distance in relation to Schopenhauer, whom he hardly mentions, his thought presents numerous points of contact with the philosopher. The notion of the Thing, so essential to Lacanian theory, whose noble Kantian and Heideggerian origins are openly recognised, has deep and hidden connections with Schopenhauer’s Thing itself, the blind and deadly Will of jouissance.

For Lacan, Desire is the Other's desire. I know nothing of my Desire, except what the Other reveals to me. Thus, the object of desire is the object of the Other's desire. Through the Other's Gaze, my Desire is constituted. It is through this Gaze that I constitute myself, as a subject. J.-D. Nasio states that “a related definition of desire is given to us: Desire is, above all, a sequel to this constitution of the I in the Other held at the Estádio do Espelho.

Lacan opposed us a philosophy of desire to a biology of passions, but he used a philosophical discourse to conceptualize the Freudian view, which he considered insufficient. Thus, he established a link between desire based on recognition (or desire for the desire of the other) and unconscious desire. Through the Hegelian idea of recognition, Lacan introduced, between 1953 and 1957, a third term, to which he gave the demand name. This is addressed to someone else and apparently focuses on an object. But this object is inessential, since the demand is the demand for love. Need, of a biological nature, is satisfied with a real object (food), while Desire is born from the distance between demand and need [18].

Desire focuses on a fantasy, on an imaginary one. In this way, Desire is the desire of the Other's desire, as it seeks its recognition, at the price of a fight to the death, which Lacan identifies with Hegel's master and slave dialectic: “The subject as the Other, for each one of the partners in the relationship, they cannot suffice as being subjects of necessity or objects of love, but they must take the place of cause of desire” [7].

And what are the relationships between desire, ethics and love? Juan-David Nasio formulates the ethics of psychoanalysis, based on Lacan’s work: creating an analyst in the analysand and. Thus, contrary to what Freud proposed (the conception of ethics would be a renunciation of desire on the part of the subject), Lacan proposes that the analyst enters with his presence, offering himself as an object to the drive, not in the sense of satisfaction, but yes, creating a circularity, sustaining the demand so that Desire can manifest itself. In this way, Lacanian psychoanalysis has its ethics centered on Desire.

Maria Rita Kehl in On Ethics and Psychoanalysis, states that:

Leading life, a little ‘beyond hypocrisy and inhibitions’ (Freud); ‘Do not give in to your desire’ (Lacan); this is the ethical proposition that psychoanalysis leads us to. The appeal, despite its strong consonance with the culture of individualism, is not without a reach in terms of social bonds. [19]. But how to reconcile the analysand’s Desire (most of the time, perverse and psychotic) and the outside world, society as a whole? Is psychoanalysis being ethical towards the social, as its ethics are based on the ethics of Desire?

Camille Dumoulié, in The Desire, states that:

Although desire can be considered the great concept of modernity, its history is identified with the history of philosophy. Desire is an elusive notion, which may refer to an extraordinary experience, but it seems to go beyond the categories of philosophical reason. Desire is certainly a living concept. Maybe it’s the very concept of life. Living is desiring.

And, in relation to contemporary ethics, Ricardo Timm de Souza states:

Ethics is the foundation of the very possibility of thinking about the human. Ethics can be contemporarily described as the fundamental nucleus, or the foundation, of every viable vital relationship between human beings and with nature, in a structure of radical responsibility [20].

**CONCLUSION**

Thus, it seems to me that ethics and desire come into conflict when we think of postmodernity and times of structures: perversion and psychosis. Jacques Derrida, likewise, in Psychoanalysis’ Soul-States [21], points to the existence of an ongoing double resistance: one, from the world to psychoanalysis and the other, from psychoanalysis to itself as well as to the world, or that is, from psychoanalysis to psychoanalysis as being-in-the-world. Derrida detects, in psychoanalysis, a crisis. A crisis in relation to the role, the place of the analyst [11].

Derrida claims that the character of the analytic session would be revolutionary. What he criticizes, however, is that psychoanalysis places itself in a superior position to the analyse and, adopting an intellectualized posture, which intends to “normalize” the subject, instead of transforming his drives, in the sense of Desire, as a search for himself.

The thinker asks us about psychoanalysis:

Psychoanalysis, I think, has not yet undertaken and, therefore, has even less managed to think, penetrate and change the axioms of ethics, legality and politics, especially in the seismic places where the theological ghost of sovereignty trembles and where the most traumatic are produced. Geopolitical events, let us say, confusingly, the cruelest of these times. It is above all there that the concept of cruelty in psychoanalysis and beyond, calls for indispensable analyzes to which we should turn. Psychoanalysis is indelible, its revolution is irreversible – and yet, as a civilization, it is deadly.
Derrida, then, questions whether there is a relationship between psychoanalysis and ethics, law and politics. And he answers that psychoanalysis, in itself, neither produces nor causes any ethics, law or policy, but it is a matter of responsibility, in these three domains, of taking psychoanalytic knowledge into account.

If psychoanalysis does not produce, nor does it cause any ethics, what relationship is there between the analyst-analyst? How is the encounter between the psychoanalyst and the patient structured? Isn’t transference configured from a pre-established ethics between them?

If psychoanalysis does not take this mutation into account, if it does not engage in it, if it does not transform itself in this rhythm, it will be – and already is, to a large extent – deported, outmoded, left by the side of the road, exposed to all drifts, to all appropriations, to all amputations; or else, conversely, it will remain rooted in the conditions of a time that was that of its birth, still aphasic in its Central European cradle.

Such questions, along with others, will be answered, or at least elucidated, broken down into others. At the end of this work, which will probably remain unfinished, always under construction, I intend to contribute to a possible reformulation of ideas and theories, which remained frozen during the course of psychoanalysis, from its origins in the late nineteenth century to post-modernity.

With this work, I intend to reach the point that the ethics of psychoanalysis must be converted from the ethics of Desire into the desire for ethics.

References